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Mindfulness training appears to promote healthy and adaptive functioning by 
enhancing self-regulatory capacity and stress resilience.  Less is known about whether 
dispositional mindfulness (DM) is similarly associated with self-regulatory capacity and 
stress resilience.  Fifty-six healthy adults completed a self-report DM questionnaire and 
performance-based measures of executive function (EF) prior to daily life experience 
sampling of affect, self-regulation, presleep arousal, and sleep quality.  DM was not 
associated with objective measures of EF but was significantly associated with self-
reported cognitive, emotional, and behavioral self-regulation.  Further, although DM was 
not associated with average affect levels (i.e., across positive/negative valence, low/high 
arousal domains), dispositionally high-mindful individuals exhibited less extreme 
changes in negative/low arousal affect (e.g., sad, bored) and negative/high arousal affect 
(e.g., stressed, angry) and evidenced less variability in positive/low arousal affect (e.g., 
relaxed, serene).  Higher DM was also associated with lower presleep arousal and higher 
sleep quality.  At the facet-level, mindful awareness was associated with daily self-
reported EF and predicted cognitive presleep arousal and sleep quality; conversely, 
mindful acceptance was associated with greater stability across negatively valenced and 
low arousal affect states, and more strongly predicted somatic presleep arousal.  Results 
indicate that mindful awareness and mindful acceptance, two distinct yet complementary 
processes, appear uniquely associated with components of self-regulation. 
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Mindfulness – defined as “nonjudgmental, present-moment awareness” (Kabat-
Zinn, 1994) – has become increasingly recognized as a possible protective factor against 
stress exposure and a moderator of the ill effects of stress.  For example, mindfulness-
based interventions (e.g., Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction, MBSR; Kabat-Zinn, 
1991) are linked to better emotional and physical health outcomes, including increased 
subjective well-being (Shapiro, Oman, Thoresen, Plante, & Flinders, 2008; Siegel, 2007), 
reduced psychological symptoms (Carmody & Baer, 2008; Chiesa & Serretti, 2010; 
Grossman, Niemann, Schmidt, & Walach, 2004; Keng, Smoski, & Robins, 2011), 
improved immune functioning (Davidson et al., 2003; Solberg, Halvorsen, Sundgot-
Borgen, Ingjer, & Holen, 1995), and attenuated psychophysiological stress reactivity 
(Brewer et al., 2009; Epel, Daubenmier, Moskowitz, Folkman, & Blackburn, 2009).   
The general consensus is that mindfulness training promotes healthy and adaptive 
functioning by enhancing self-regulatory capacity and stress resilience (Brown & Ryan, 
2003; Chiesa & Serretti, 2009; E. L. Garland, Gaylord, & Fredrickson, 2011; Goldin & 
Gross, 2010).  What is less known is whether self-regulatory capacity and stress 
resilience are similarly associated with variations in dispositional mindfulness (DM).  
Beneficial associations between DM and emotional and physical health mirror those 
observed with mindfulness-based interventions (e.g., Coffey & Hartman, 2008; Creswell, 




Lakey, Campbell, Brown, & Goodie, 2007), and several individual difference factors 
related to self-regulatory capacity are conceptually and empirically linked to DM.  Thus, 
prior research suggests that DM may also promote stress resilience via improved stress 
regulation, although the exact mechanisms remain unclear.  The purpose of the current 
study, therefore, was to examine the relationship between DM, self-regulatory capacity, 






 Mindfulness was introduced to Western medicine as an individual difference 
factor—a “basic human quality” characterized by the tendency to attend to and accept 
present moment experiences (Kabat-Zinn, 1994; Santorelli & Kabat-Zinn, 2013).  
Although the vast majority of mindfulness research has examined the efficacy of 
mindfulness-based interventions (MBIs), important issues concerning the nature, 
structure, and measurement of dispositional mindfulness (DM) have emerged over the 
past two decades and can be used to guide current research (see Rau & Williams, 2015 
for review).   
First, DM is a distinct construct within the broader theoretical framework of 
mindfulness.  Specifically, high self-reported mindfulness has different implications 
depending on exposure to mindfulness training.  Different response patterns have been 
observed between samples trained versus untrained in mindfulness (Baer et al., 2008; 
Christopher, Charoensuk, Gilbert, Neary, & Pearce, 2009).  For example, the association 
between the Observe facet from the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ: Baer, 
Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006) and measures of psychological adjustment 
is positive in meditating samples but nonsignificant or negative in nonmeditating samples 
(Baer et al., 2008).  Further, the type of mindfulness experienced during meditation 
appears unrelated to the type of mindfulness experienced in everyday life (Carmody, 




suggest that DM is an independent construct from trained mindfulness and should be 
informed by empirical investigations of DM per se rather than extrapolating from the 
more extensive MBI evidence base. 
Second, DM appears to be a multidimensional construct represented by a 2-factor 
model.  The 2-factor model was first proposed during a consensus meeting designed to 
operationally define mindfulness: 
The first component involves the self-regulation of attention so that it is 
maintained on immediate experience, thereby allowing for increased recognition 
of mental events in the present moment.  The second component involves 
adopting a particular orientation toward one’s experiences in the present moment, 
an orientation that is characterized by curiosity, openness, and acceptance. (Bishop 
et al., 2004, p. 232) 
  
Since this definition was proposed, support for the 2-factor model has been well 
documented.  Despite differences in measurement and descriptive language, reported 2-
factor solutions have striking conceptual similarities: presence and acceptance (Brown & 
Ryan, 2003; Kohls, Sauer, & Walach, 2009), awareness and acceptance (Cardaciotto, 
Herbert, Forman, Moitra, & Farrow, 2008), observing and nonjudging (Evans & 
Segerstrom, 2011), and decentering and curiosity (Lau et al., 2006).  Collectively, these 
findings indicate that DM should be examined as a multidimensional construct consisting 










MECHANISMS FOR DISPOSITIONAL MINDFULNESS 
ASSOCIATIONS WITH STRESS REGULATION 
 
Associations between dispositional mindfulness (DM) and stress regulation 
processes reveal patterns of fewer and less extreme stress appraisals (e.g., Ciesla, Reilly, 
Dickson, Emanuel, & Updegraff, 2012; Evans & Segerstrom, 2011; Heppner et al., 2008; 
Marks, Sobanski, & Hine, 2010), attenuated stress reactivity (e.g., Arch & Craske, 2010; 
Barnes et al., 2007; Brown & Ryan, 2003; Brown, Goodman, & Inzlicht, 2013; Brown, 
Weinstein, & Creswell, 2012; Daubenmier, Hayden, Chang, & Epel, 2014; Holt, 2012), 
faster stress recovery (e.g., Arch & Craske, 2010; Drach-Zahavy & Marzuq, 2013; Holt, 
2012), and better stress restoration (i.e., sleep; e.g., Allen & Kiburz, 2012; S. N. Garland, 
Campbell, Samuels, & Carlson, 2013; Murphy, Mermelstein, Edwards, & Gidycz, 2012).  
Further, these associations have been found with both subjective and objective measures 
(e.g., psychological, cognitive, neurobiological, and physiological), suggesting that DM 
elicits salutary effects through dynamic, interactive processes that are both “top-down” 
and “bottom-up.”  Based on these findings, we propose three potential mechanisms by 
which DM may confer stress resilience. 
 
Executive Functioning 
The term executive functioning (EF) refers to cognitive and behavioral control 
abilities that allow for purposeful, goal-directed behavior in everyday life (Cummings & 




individual to regulate behavior as needed to achieve short- and long-term goals.  
Importantly, individual differences in EF are linked to stress regulation (see Williams,  
Suchy, & Rau, 2009 for review) and believed to promote the stress-buffering effects of 
DM.   
From a neuroanatomical standpoint, EF relies on neural networks involved with 
processing and responding to stress, including the prefrontal cortex (i.e., monitoring and 
regulating behavior), the limbic system (i.e., emotional processing), and the brain stem 
(i.e., autonomic arousal and control).  Even mild disruptions to these networks, for 
example following mild traumatic brain injury, can produce behavioral, emotional, and 
physiological dysregulation (Alexander, 1995; Marschark, Richtsmeier, Richardson, 
Crovitz, & Henry, 2000) that undermines effective stress regulation.  Similarly, certain 
psychiatric populations characterized by poor stress regulation evidence poor EF abilities 
(e.g., borderline personality disorder: Fertuck, Lenzenweger, & Clarkin, 2005; obsessive-
compulsive disorder: Olley, Malhi, & Sachdev, 2007; major depressive disorder: 
Paelecke-Habermann, Pohl, & Leplow, 2005).  Patterns of executive dysfunction and 
impaired stress regulation are believed to generalize beyond clinical populations, such 
that individual differences in EF in neuropsychiatrically healthy adults (Friedman et al., 
2008; Kane & Engle, 2002; Miyake et al., 2000) may confer stress risk or resilience 
(Williams et al., 2009). 
Numerous studies report positive associations between mindfulness and EF 
following mindfulness training (e.g., mindfulness meditation; see Chiesa, Calati, & 
Serretti, 2011 for a review), as well as between DM and brain regions subserving EF 




behavioral markers of EF show consistent positive associations between DM and 
performance on experimental cognitive tasks measuring controlled attention (e.g., Black, 
Semple, Pokhrel, & Grenard, 2011; Cheyne, Carriere, & Smilek, 2006; Oberle, Schonert-
Reichl, Lawlor, & Thomson, 2011; Ostafin, Kassman, & Wessel, 2013) as well as self-
report inventories of self-regulatory capacity (Black et al., 2011; Lakey et al., 2007).  
Future research is needed to substantiate preliminary support for the link between DM 
and EF.  Combining more direct measures of EF – such as standardized 
neuropsychological tests and in vivo (i.e., experience sampling) reports – with 
multidimensional assessments of DM may reveal important insights about the 
mechanisms linking DM to stress regulation.   
 
Affective Stability 
The range and degree of variability in mood states fall under the domain of 
affective stability, also referred to as emotional equanimity, emotional lability, and 
affective instability.  Variations in mood have been examined as alternations between 
positive and negative affect (Ebner-Priemer et al., 2007), momentary shifts in affective 
states (Koenigsberg et al., 2002), and changes in mood across hours or days (Cowdry, 
Gardner, O'Leary, Leibenluft, & Rubinow, 1991).  Because affective changes often occur 
secondary to stressful encounters (Fabes & Eisenberg, 1997), affective stability is an 
important marker of stress regulation and may be one mechanism by which DM promotes 
stress resilience.    
The link between emotions and regulatory capacity is well documented.  
Disruption to regulatory networks (i.e., prefrontal cortex, limbic system, brainstem 




Reiss, 2013; Morris, Robinson, & Raphael, 1993).  Similarly, affective instability is 
associated with psychiatric symptomatology (e.g., borderline personality features: 
McConville & Cooper, 1998; Trull et al., 2008; depressive states: McConville & Cooper, 
1998; Peeters, Berkhof, Delespaul, Rottenberg, & Nicolson, 2006) and linked to risk 
factors for developing psychopathology (e.g., neuroticism: Eid & Diener, 2004; Kuppens, 
Oravecz, & Tuerlinckx, 2010; Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Nezlek, Dossche, & 
Timmermans, 2007; low self-esteem: Rhodewalt, Madrian, & Cheney, 1998; Zeigler-Hill 
& Abraham, 2006).  These findings suggest that affective stability may be a protective 
factor against stress-related illness and may reflect greater regulatory capacity more 
generally. 
Evidence of emotional equipoise has been documented in dispositionally high-
mindful individuals.  Neuroimaging studies indicate that DM modulates neural responses 
during early phases of affective processing, especially for emotionally evocative stimuli 
(Brown et al., 2013), and is associated with decreased volume of the amygdala (Creswell 
et al., 2007; Taren, Creswell, & Gianaros, 2013) – a brain region involved with detecting 
and responding to threat.  Consistent with these findings, higher reports of DM are 
associated with less emotional reactivity to experimentally induced stressors (Arch & 
Craske, 2010; Barnes et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2013) and fewer retrospective reports of 
perceived stress in daily life (Araas, 2008; Black, Milam, Sussman, & Johnson, 2012).  
Similarly, in daily life, DM predicts less frequent and less intense reports of negative 
affect (Brown & Ryan, 2003) and less variability in affective intensity over time (Hill & 
Updegraff, 2012). 




affective stability.  Although the first study of DM and affective stability (Brown & 
Ryan, 2003) utilized an ideal methodological approach that combined experience 
sampling data with multilevel modeling techniques to determine between-subjects 
variability in affect, the use of a unidimensional measure of DM limited the 
generalizability of these findings to multidimensional models of DM.  A similar and more 
recent study (Hill & Updegraff, 2012) did use a multidimensional measure of DM (i.e., 
FFMQ) but relied on less sophisticated statistical approaches which addressed variability 
in affect (i.e., mean of within-subject standard deviations) but not necessarily the degree 
of change in affect over time.  Combining the benefits of these two studies (i.e., 
multidimensional measurement of DM, experience sampling of affect, multilevel 
approach) while simultaneously examining indices of regulatory capacity could address 




Stress resilience is often conceptualized as the ability to maintain balance and 
stability over time (Lukey & Tepe, 2008).  Thus, the ability to successfully recover from 
a stressful experience – cognitively, emotionally, and physiologically – is an important 
marker of stress resilience.  Conversely, the inability to restore balance and stability can 
prolong arousal and diminish regulatory capacity needed to manage future stressors.  
Along these lines, one important index of prolonged arousal – presleep arousal (PSA) – 
can be viewed as both a measure of stress recovery and a predictor of stress restoration.   
PSA refers to both cognitive and physiological/somatic arousal experienced 




PSA, including presleep mental activity and ruminative cognitions, is associated with 
subjective disruptions in sleep (Broman & Hetta, 1994; Lichstein & Rosenthal, 1980; 
Nicassio et al., 1985; Ohayon, Caulet, & Guilleminault, 1997) and greater sleep onset 
latency (Borkovec, Grayson, O'Brien, & Weerts, 1979; Kuisk, Bertelson, & Walsh, 
1989), and differentiates good sleepers from insomniacs (Robertson, Broomfield, & 
Espie, 2007).  Physiological/somatic PSA refers to autonomic nervous system arousal – 
indexed via self-report and objective measurement (i.e., electrocardiography, 
electromyography, and electroencephalography) – that interferes with sleep onset and 
maintenance.  Recent models suggest that somatic PSA emerges from more pervasive 
hyperarousal processes indicative of impaired regulatory capacity (Bastien, Guimond, St-
Jean, & Lemelin, 2008; Bonnet & Arand, 2010; Riemann et al., 2010).  In sum, daytime 
stress regulation bears directly on PSA and subjective sleep quality (Winzeler et al., 
2014).  How well an individual manages stress during the day can therefore function as a 
protective factor in the development of stress-related disorders, such as clinical insomnia 
(Morin, Rodrigue, & Ivers, 2003).   
Dispositionally high-mindful individuals evidence effective stress recovery across 
both emotional and physiological parameters following laboratory-induced stressors 
(Arch & Craske, 2010; Holt, 2012).  Generalized to daily life, this suggests that DM 
promotes rapid recovery from everyday stressors and decreases instances of prolonged 
arousal, such as PSA.  Consistent with this hypothesis, higher DM is associated with 
lower self-reported PSA (Howell et al., 2008) as well as better self-reported sleep quality 
(Allen & Kiburz, 2012; S. N. Garland et al., 2013; Howell, Digdon, & Buro, 2010; 




Preliminary evidence suggests that DM promotes more effective daytime stress 
regulation, protects against prolonged arousal, and facilitates restorative processes (i.e., 
sleep).  However, additional research is needed to expand and build upon these findings.  
For example, examining the relative contribution of DM to cognitive versus somatic PSA 
may clarify mechanisms linking mindfulness to decreased arousal.  Incorporating 
measures of daytime stress regulation could provide additional insights into the 
relationship between DM and self-regulatory depletion (i.e., PSA), especially when 























THE CURRENT STUDY 
 
The purpose of the current study was to examine the relationship between 
dispositional mindfulness (DM), self-regulatory capacity (i.e., executive functioning), 
and stress regulation (i.e., affective stability, presleep arousal) in everyday life.  We 
combined objective assessments (i.e., neurocognitive testing) and first-person reports 
(i.e., daily diary, nighttime ratings of executive functioning and presleep arousal, morning 
sleep diary) in the context of everyday life to examine three primary hypotheses.   
First, because dispositionally high-mindful individuals are expected to respond to 
everyday experiences in a regulated yet flexible manner, we predicted that DM would be 
positively associated with self-regulatory capacity – measured via behavioral and self-
reported executive functioning – and stress regulation – operationalized as affective 
stability throughout the day.  Second, because moment-to-moment self-regulation is 
believed to promote more effective stress recovery and restorative processes, we 
predicted that DM would be negatively associated with presleep arousal and positively 
associated with sleep quality.  Third, if DM is associated with executive functioning, 
affective stability, and restorative processes (i.e., presleep arousal, sleep quality), we 
predicted that executive functioning and affective stability would mediate the relationship 









 Participants included 79 healthy adults (32% male; mean age = 27 years, SD = 
6.5) recruited from University of Utah undergraduate psychology courses and the greater 
Salt Lake City community.  The race composition of the sample was 91% Caucasian, 5% 
Asian Pacific, 4% unspecified.  Exclusionary criteria included age beyond 20-45 years; 
primary language other than English; left hand dominant; symptoms indicative of clinical 
insomnia; visual impairments that could interfere with reading or computerized tasks; 
arm impairments that could interfere with cognitive task performance; current pregnancy; 
current use of tobacco; history of brain trauma, seizures, brain tumor, stroke or aneurysm, 
brain surgery, heart surgery, Multiple Sclerosis, major orthopedic surgery, hypertension, 
pulmonary disorder, or renal failure; and current use of cardiovascular, neuroleptic, or 
hypnotic medications (e.g., beta blockers).   
 
Procedures 
Following informed consent and eligibility screening, participants completed a 4-
day protocol.  On Day 1, participants completed a laboratory assessment that included 
self-reported dispositional mindfulness and executive cognitive functioning.  On Days 2-
3, participants completed first-person reports of daily functioning that included multiple 
daytime ratings of affect acquired through electronic diary, nighttime ratings of executive 




Day 4, participants provided final sleep ratings, returned laboratory equipment, and 
underwent debriefing and compensation procedures.   
 
Baseline Assessment Measures 
Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire  
 The Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer et al., 2006) is a 39-item 
multidimensional measure of dispositional mindfulness.  Items are rated on a 5-point 
Likert scale from 1 (never or vary rarely true) to 5 (very often or always true).  Scores are 
calculated across five facets, with higher scores reflecting higher levels of dispositional 
mindfulness: Observe (8 items; e.g., “I pay attention to sensations, such as the wind in 
my hair or sun on my face.”), Describe (8 items; e.g., “I can easily put my beliefs, 
opinions, and expectations into words.”), Act with awareness (8 items; e.g., “I find it 
difficult to stay focused on what’s happening in the present.” reverse-scored), Nonjudge 
(8 items; e.g., “I tell myself I shouldn’t be feeling the way I’m feeling.” reverse-scored), 
and Nonreact (7 items; “I watch my feelings without getting lost in them.”).   
The FFMQ is the result of a large-scale factor analysis of five common self-report 
measures of mindfulness (Baer et al., 2006).  This measure has a well-defined factor 
structure that corresponds to predicted criterion variables (e.g., openness to experience, 
self-compassion) and demonstrates good internal consistency across the five facets (alpha 
coefficients: Observe = .83; Describe = .91; Act with awareness = .87; Nonjudge = .87; 
Nonreact = .75).  Importantly, however, Observe did not contribute to the overall 
mindfulness construct, and Describe and Nonjudge were only modestly correlated with 
the total score.  From a theoretical perspective, these qualities appear the least related to 




Creswell, 2007; Gunaratana, 2002) and may better reflect learned skills than dispositional 
attributes.  Conversely, Act with awareness and Nonreact provided the strongest 
association with the overall mindfulness construct, followed by Nonjudge.   
To identify the best theoretical and empirical approach to operationalizing DM in 
this sample, we systematically examined the contribution of each FFMQ subscale.  We 
first calculated the Chronbach’s alpha for the total FFMQ score when all five subscales 
were included (α = .65).  We then removed subscales, one by one, until the optimal fit of 
reliability and number of subscales was obtained.  A total of three subscales was retained 
– Act with Awareness, Nonreact, and Nonjudge. This finding is consistent with the 2-
factor model of DM (Bishop et al., 2004; Brown & Ryan, 2003; Cardaciotto et al., 2008; 
Evans & Segerstrom, 2011; Kohls et al., 2009; Lau et al., 2006) that considers both the 
focus of attention (i.e., awareness of present-moment experiences) and the quality of 
attention (i.e., acceptance of present-moment experiences).  We therefore operationally 
defined DM as the sum of the FFMQ facets Act with awareness (i.e., representing 
awareness factor) and Nonreact and Nonjudge (i.e., together representing the acceptance 
factor).  Chronbach’s alphas were .88 for the DM composite score, .82 for the mindful 
awareness score, and .84 for the mindful acceptance score.   
 
Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System 
 Assessment of executive cognitive functioning involved standard administration 
and scoring of four subtests from the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS; 
Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001).  From these subtests, conditions that reflect components 
of executive attentional control and cognitive flexibility were selected: Trail Making 




Inhibition/Switching completion times), Verbal Fluency (Letter and Category correct 
responses), and Design Fluency (number of correct responses across three conditions).  
An EF composite score was calculated by averaging the age-corrected scaled scores 
across the eight conditions, with higher scores indicating better performance. 
Given the hierarchical organization of cognitive functions (Stuss, Picton, & 
Alexander, 2001), we controlled for lower order processes (e.g., working memory, 
processing speed) that are inherently assessed during cognitive testing.  First, conditions 
that reflect lower order processes (i.e., psychomotor speed, scanning and sequencing 
abilities, naming and reading abilities) were selected, including four conditions from the 
Trail Making Test (Visual Scanning, Number Sequencing, Letter Sequencing, Motor 
Speed) and two conditions from the Color-Word Interference Test (Color Naming, Word 
Reading).  Next, a nonexecutive composite score was calculated by averaging the age-
corrected scaled scores across the six component process conditions.  We then removed 
the lower order process variance from the EF composite and used the nonexecutive 
composite score to control for component process variance.  The resulting unstandardized 
residual for the EF composite was used as the final measure. 
Due to procedural modifications early in the study, the D-KEFS Trail Making 
Test was not included in the initial study protocol.  Consequently, 12 participants 
received all D-KEFS measures except the Trail Making Test.  We therefore imputed 
missing values by using scores obtained on the nine other test conditions included in the 
executive and nonexecutive composites, together with demographic variables (i.e., age, 
education, and gender), to predict the missing values.  Chronbach’s alphas were .75 for 




Experience Sampling Measures 
Daily Diary 
 The intensity and variability of affective states were assessed via PalmPilot.  
Participants were prompted at random approximately once per hour (i.e., 14 times per 
day) on Days 2 and 3 of the study protocol.  Participants were encouraged to respond to 
as many prompts as possible but were also given the option to skip a prompt if unable to 
respond (e.g., driving, business meeting).  Completion rates varied by participant and 
study day.  On Day 2 of the protocol, 62 participants completed at least one diary (range 
1-12; mean = 6.19, SD = 2.68).  On Day 3 of the protocol, 54 participants completed at 
least one diary (range 1-11; mean = 5.67, SD = 2.74).  Because participants completed 
significantly more diaries on Day 2 compared to Day 3 [t (53) = 2.24, p < .05], only Day 
2 affect ratings were included in the analyses. 
A total of 21 emotional descriptors were selected in an effort to represent a broad 
range of affective states across the affective circumplex (Russell, 1980), including 
positive valence/high arousal (i.e., excited, elated, in awe, sense of wonder), positive 
valence/low arousal (i.e., relaxed, calm, serene, contented, happy), negative valence/high 
arousal (i.e., stressed, tense, angry, worried, upset, nervous), and negative valence/low 
arousal (i.e., sad, lethargic, bored, depressed, distractible, fatigued).  Each item was 
presented using the same stem question (e.g., “How SAD do you feel right now?”) and 
rated on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much).  The order of affect 
items presented at each prompt was randomized to reduce careless or overlearned 
responding.  Chronbach’s alphas, calculated using affect ratings obtained on the first day 




positive valence/low arousal ratings, .96 for negative valence/high arousal ratings, and 
.88 for negative valence/low arousal ratings. 
The construct “affective stability” has been examined using several different 
approaches.  One common and relatively accessible approach involves computing an 
intraindividual variability (IIV) score, in which the degree of fluctuation around a central 
tendency (typically standard deviation around person-means) is examined (e.g., Castro-
Schilo & Ferrer, 2013; Eid & Diener, 1999; Ferrer, Steele, & Hsieh, 2012; Jacobs, van 
Os, Derom, Thiery, Delespaul, et al., 2011; Komulainen et al., 2014; McConville & 
Cooper, 1998; Russell et al., 2007).  Although the IIV metric addresses the degree of 
fluctuation or dispersion around an individual’s average level of affect, this approach 
fails to account for the effect of time on changes in daily life affect.  As stated by Ebner-
Priemer and colleagues (2009) and demonstrated by multiple studies (e.g., Ebner-Priemer 
et al., 2007; Jahng, Wood, & Trull, 2010; Larsen, 1987; Trull et al., 2008), a major 
component of instability is temporal dependency.   
The current study examined affective stability using multiple approaches.  The 
first approach involved calculating a raw IIV score for each affect rating separately (i.e., 
SDs around person-means for each of the 21 affective descriptors), and then averaging 
the raw IIVs according to the four valence/arousal categories.  The second approach 
involved assessing temporal dependence (i.e., fixed or random effect of time, via 
multilevel modeling), removing linear effects of time (i.e., “detrending;” Curran & Bauer, 
2011), calculating a modified IIV score for each affect rating separately (i.e., SD of 
detrended residuals for each of the 21 affective descriptors), and averaging the modified 




scores were included in analyses to examine variability in affect with and without 
examining affect as a time-varying covariate.  We also examined the direction of change 
in affect over time (i.e., raw regression slopes averaged within each valence/arousal 
affect group) as well as the degree of change in affect over time (i.e., absolute value of 
regression slopes averaged within each valence/arousal affect group).  
 
Executive Functioning Log 
At the end of each day (i.e., Days 2-3), participants completed a questionnaire 
assessing lapses in executive functioning experienced during the day.  A total of 9 items 
were selected from well-validated self-report measures of EF, including the Behavior 
Rating Inventory of Executive Function (BRIEF; Gioia, Isquith, Guy, & Kenworthy, 
2000) and the Conners’ Adult ADHD Rating scales (CAARS; Conners, Erhardt, & 
Sparrow, 1996), in order to measure subjective difficulties in emotion regulation (e.g., 
“Thinking of today only, how often did you feel easily frustrated?”), cognitive regulation 
(e.g., “Thinking of today only, how often did you become distracted by things going on 
around you?”), and behavioral regulation (e.g., “Thinking of today only, how often did 
you say or do things without thinking?”).  Items were rated on a 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from 0 (not at all) to 4 (constantly).  Because affect ratings from Day 2 only were 
used in the current analyses, only nighttime EF ratings collected on Day 2 were included 
in the analyses.  Chronbach’s alphas were .64 for the global EF rating, .73 for the 
emotion regulation subscale, .65 for the cognitive regulation subscale, and .59 for the 






Presleep Arousal Scale 
Before going to bed each night, participants rated levels of mental and physical 
arousal.  The Presleep Arousal Scale (PSAS; Nicassio et al., 1985) consists of 16 items 
rated from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely), with questions evenly divided between a 
cognitive subscale, which asks about sleep- and nonsleep-related worry and overall 
cognitive arousal, and a somatic subscale, which asks about physical symptoms of 
arousal and anxiety before bed.  Higher scores on the PSAS have been found to 
differentiate between clinical insomnia and normal sleepers (Robertson et al., 2007).  In 
this study, Chronbach’s alpha for the PSAS was .75. 
 
Morning Sleep Diary 
Upon waking each morning (i.e., Days 2-4), participants were asked to rate the 
previous night’s sleep on four items measuring 1) global sleep quality, 2) 
satisfaction/dissatisfaction with sleep quality, (3) worry/distress about sleep quality, and 
(4) the degree to which participants felt rested or refreshed.  Items were rated on a 4-point 
Likert scale ranging from 0 to 3.  The total score was used to index sleep quality upon 
waking the morning of Day 3 (i.e., following Day 2 night’s sleep).  The Chronbach’s 







 To test the assumption of normality, basic descriptive statistics and Shapiro-Wilk 
test statistics were calculated for each measure (Table 1).  All obtained values were 
within expected ranges, and no outliers were identified or removed.  Variables flagged 
for possible non-normal distribution (Shapiro-Wilk p <.05) were subjected to additional 
assessment of normality, including examination of skewness, kurtosis, histogram graph, 
box plot, and Normal Q-Q Plots.  Due to the generally healthy, nonclinical nature of the 
sample, several variables were positively skewed (i.e., scores concentrated at low end of 
distribution) but with skewness z scores less than 2.75 (greater than 3.29 indicates 
statistically significant skewness at p<.05).  However, when examining the average affect 
ratings by valence/arousal group, most distributions were significantly positively skewed 
(i.e., scores concentrated at the low end of the distribution).  Therefore, as suggested by 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) and Howell (2007), positive skewness was corrected.  First, 
positively skewed scores were reflected, which involved subtracting the valence/arousal 
average rating from six (i.e., one greater than the largest possible score of five).  We then 
log base-10 transformed the absolute value of the reflected score, which yielded modified 





 Given the complexity of study procedures, missing data were expected. Using the 
six measures included in data analysis (i.e., FFMQ, executive composite, daily diary, EF 
log, PSAS, sleep quality composite), Little’s Missing Completely at Random (MCAR) 
test was used to test the null hypothesis that data is missing at random.  The resulting chi-
square of 15.01 (df = 12; p = .24) indicates that data were missing at random and that no 
missing data techniques were needed.  However, because approximately 29% of the 
sample either failed to respond to daily diary prompts or responded to less than three 
diary prompts, we took additional efforts to determine whether under-responders differed 
significantly from responders on any study measures.  Results of independent t-tests 
revealed no significant differences (ps > .05) on measures of dispositional mindfulness, 
executive functioning (behavioral and self-reported), presleep arousal, and sleep quality 
when comparing non-responders (n=17) and low-responders (i.e., <3 diary responses; 
n=6) to responders (i.e., 3+ diary responses; n=56).   
 
Sample Characteristics 
 Because daytime affect ratings were central to the current investigation, and 
because we were interested in variability across affect ratings, only participants with 
three or more affect ratings on Day 2 (i.e., first day of experience sampling) were 
included in the final analyses.  The resulting sample included 56 healthy young adults 
(32% male; age range = 20-45, mean = 27.45, SD = 6.24) who completed between 14-23 
years of education (M = 16.30, SD = 2.11).  The race of the final sample was 91% 
Caucasian, 7% Asian, and 2% unspecified.  Descriptive statistics for each measure using 




Daily Diary Affect Ratings 
Five scores were calculated to examine affect ratings obtained during the first day 
of experience sampling. 
 
Valence/arousal Composite  
Ratings were averaged across each of the 21 affective descriptors, creating 21 
affect composites per participant.  These 21 affect composites were then averaged by 
valence/arousal group: negative valence/high arousal (i.e., stressed, tense, angry, worried, 
upset, nervous), and negative valence/low arousal (i.e., sad, lethargic, bored, depressed, 
distractible, fatigued), positive valence/high arousal (i.e., excited, elated, in awe, sense of 
wonder), positive valence/low arousal (i.e., relaxed, calm, serene, contented, happy).  As 
indicated in Table 3, valence/arousal composites were consistently positively skewed.  
The majority of participants endorsed low to moderate levels of negative affect on 
average, with composite scores generally falling between one and two on a 5-point scale 
regardless of arousal.  Positively valenced/high arousal affect was also positively skewed, 
although to a lesser extreme.  Positively valenced/low arousal affect was normally 
distributed; however, the range was more restricted, with composite scores generally 
falling between 2 and 4.   
 
Raw Intraindividual Variability Score 
The first set of intraindividual variability (IIV) scores was calculated by first 
obtaining the standard deviations (SDs) around the mean for each affect rating separately.  
For each participant, the resulting 21 SDs were then averaged by valence/arousal group, 




normally distributed.  Variability around the mean averaged .5 SDs for each of the 
valence/arousal affect ratings, with the exception of the positive/low arousal ratings, 
which averaged .77 SDs. 
 
Modified Intraindividual Variability Score 
Examination of individual fit lines across affect ratings revealed a high degree of 
variability in intercepts and slopes across participants, suggesting a linear trend for most 
affective descriptors.  To examine the effect of time on affect ratings and determine 
whether affect represents a time-varying covariate, two types of unconditional multilevel 
models were conducted for each affective descriptor.   
First, a series of unconditional means models were conducted.  This type of 
multilevel model does not include level-1 or level-2 predictors.  Rather, the purpose of 
this model is to partition variance and determine a) whether systematic variation in affect 
ratings exists, and b) whether systematic variation lies within or between participants.  
The following unconditional means model – in which no level-1 or level-2 predictors are 
included – was conducted, where AFFECT represents the affective descriptor, j 
represents the participant, and i represents the sequence of diary prompt: 
L1: AFFECTij = β0j + rij 
L2: β0j = γ00 + u0j 
Intraclass correlation coefficients, which reflect the proportion of total variance that 
exists between participants, are listed in Table 4.  For example, the ICC obtained for 
WORRIED was .60, indicating that 60% of the total variance was between participants 
(i.e., level-2 individual difference factors) and 40% of the variance was within 




Second, a series of unconditional growth models was conducted, in which time is 
included as a level-1 predictor.  This model allowed us to a) evaluate the presence of 
temporal dependence, and b) determine whether the effect of time is fixed (i.e., between-
persons) or random (i.e., within-persons).  The following unconditional growth model 
was conducted, where AFFECT represents the affective descriptor, TIME represents the 
sequence of diary prompts, j represents the participant, and i represents the diary prompt: 
L1: AFFECTij = β0j + β1j*(TIMEij) + rij 
 
L2: β0j = γ00 + u0j 
              β1j = γ10 + u1j 
 
As indicated in Table 4, there was a significant random effect of time for the majority 
(i.e., 15) of affective descriptors included in this study, indicating significant variability 
in both participants’ beginning levels of affect and participants’ affect-time slopes.  In 
other words, the overall significant effect of time reflects intercepts and slopes that vary 
randomly for each participant.  In addition, there was a significant fixed effect of time for 
three low arousal ratings (i.e., lethargic, bored, serene), indicating that linear changes in 
these specific affect types are generalizable to the population being estimated.   
Because there was a significant linear effect of time on affect ratings, modified 
IIV scores were calculated to examine variability in affect after removing the affect-time 
slope.  That is, rather than examining standard deviations of affect ratings around the 
horizontal line (i.e., person-means), the process of “detrending” (e.g., Curran & Bauer, 
2011) allowed us to examine standard deviations of residualized affect ratings around 
affect-time slopes.  Given that temporal dependence was observed in the majority of 
affect ratings, and at least half of each valence/arousal group, we detrended each affect 




time (i.e., sequence of diary prompts, grand-mean centered) for each participant using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.  We then subtracted the estimated affect rating 
produced by OLS regression at each observation for each participant to create a within-
person component of the affect rating, and used the intercept from OLS regression as the 
between-person component of the affect rating.  Consequently, the obtained residualized 
ratings reflect the degree of fluctuation in affect without the effect of time.  
Modified IIV scores were then calculated using the standard deviations of 
residualized affect ratings, averaged by valence/arousal group.  In general, modified IIV 
scores were normally distributed with average variability around .5 SDs (Table 3).  The 
exception to this general finding occurred with positive/low arousal ratings, which were 
both positively skewed and less variable when compared to other modified IIV scores 
and when compared to the raw positive/low arousal IIV score. 
 
Affect-time Direction of Change   
To examine the direction of change in affect over time, the individual regression 
slopes for each affect rating were averaged by valence/arousal category.  On average, 
participants exhibited only slight decreases in affect ratings over time (mean slopes range 
-.01 – -.03).  Closer examination of the distribution of slopes revealed modest to strong (-
.1– -.75) decreases in affect ratings over time for a subset of the sample: 20% for 
negative/low arousal, 16% for negative/high arousal, 21% for positive/low arousal, and 
11% for positive/high arousal.  With the exception of positive/high arousal ratings, 
substantially fewer participants exhibited modest to strong increases in affect ratings over 
time: 7% for negative/low arousal, 7% for negative/high arousal, 9% for positive/low 




Affect-time Rate of Change  
To examine the degree of change in affect over time, regardless of direction, the 
absolute value of individual regression slopes for each affect rating were averaged 
according to valence/arousal affect group.  In other words, rate of change over time can 
be used to index overall affective stability, with higher rates of change indicating 
decreased stability.  As expected based on rates of directional changes observed with raw 
slopes, approximately one quarter of the sample exhibited modest to strong linear 



















Table 1.  
Original sample (n=79): Descriptive statistics for predictor and outcome variables. 
  
           N   Range    Mean (SD)  Skew z 
  
 Predictor 




 Dispositional Mindfulness 78 45-96 76.01 (11.07)   -0.67 
  
 Self-Regulatory Capacity 




 Executive Functioning  
  
 Behavioral Composite 79 -3.31-2.62 0.00 (1.39) -1.11 
  
 Evening Diary 68 0-13 5.32 (3.15) 2.16  
  
 Stress Regulation 





Daytime Affective Stability 
    




 Negative/low arousal composite^ 1.15-4.69 1.98 (.79) 6.92 
  
 Negative/high arousal composite^ 1.00-4.69 1.82 (.92) 6.60 
  
 Positive/low arousal composite 1.97-4.27 3.03 (.55) 0.77 
  
 Positive/high arousal composite^ 1.00-4.50 1.92 (.80) 3.52  
  
 Presleep Arousal 68 11-46 25.96 (5.65) 2.67  
  
 Morning Sleep Quality 
Composite 69 0-12 4.62 (3.03) 1.70  
  
 ^Indicates scores that were transformed prior to conducting parametric tests.  
 
 





Modified sample (n=56): Descriptive statistics for predictor and outcome variables. 
 
        Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
Predictor Variable 
  





Behavioral Composite 56 -2.48 2.62 0.12 1.34 
Evening Diary 52 0 13 5.08 3.11 
Set Loss 0 5 2.08 1.56 
Emotion Regulation 0 6 1.52 1.43 
Behavior Regulation 0 7 1.48 1.51 
Stress Regulation 
  
Daytime Affective Stability 56
   
Negative/low arousal composite 1.15 4.69 1.98 0.79 
Negative/high arousal composite 1.00 4.69 1.82 0.92 
Positive/low arousal composite 1.97 4.27 3.03 0.55 
Positive/high arousal composite 1.00 4.50 1.92 0.80 
Presleep Arousal 52 11 46 25.58 5.85 
Somatic Arousal 10 28 16.00 4.38 
Cognitive Arousal 8 18 9.88 2.14 
Morning Sleep Quality Composite 54 0 12 4.74 3.09 
 
 





Modified sample (n=56): Descriptive statistics for daily diary affect metrics. 
 
Valence Arousal Affect Group Min Max Mean SD Skewness z 
Negative/low arousal 
Valence/arousal composite^ 1.15 4.69 1.98 0.79 6.92 
Raw IIV score .17 1.06 0.57 0.22 0.39 
Modified IIV score .09 1.02 0.45 0.21 1.64 
Affect-time slope -.56 .50 -.04 0.13 -.36 
Affect-time slope (abs) .01 .48 0.09 0.09 8.20 
Negative/high arousal 
Valence/-arousal composite^ 1.00 4.69 1.82 0.92 6.60 
Raw IIV score 0 1.29 0.56 0.27 1.51 
Modified IIV score 0 1.05 0.50 0.24 1.21 
Affect-time slope -.41 .19 -.03 0.10 -3.97 
Affect-time slope (abs) .00 .41 0.08 0.08 7.16 
Positive/low arousal 
Valence/arousal composite 1.97 4.27 3.03 0.55 0.77 
Raw IIV score .35 1.48 0.77 0.22 1.64 
Modified IIV score .05 .62 0.26 0.12 4.30 
Affect-time slope -.87 .41 -.03 0.15 -7.82 
Affect-time slope (abs) .02 .41 0.11 0.07 6.48 
Positive/high arousal 
Valence/arousal composite^ 1.00 4.50 1.92 0.80 3.52 
Raw IIV score 0 1.13 0.57 0.27 -0.04 
Modified IIV score 0 1.00 0.49 0.25 0.35 
Affect-time slope -.75 .32 -.02 0.14 -8.61 
Affect-time slope (abs) .00 .75 0.10 0.12 11.64 
^Indicates scores that were transformed prior to conducting parametric tests. 







Results of unconditional means models and unconditional growth models.
Variance Fixed effects Random effects
Affect Rating ICC Between Within t df p X2 df p
Negative/Low Arousal
Sad 0.852 85.21 14.79 -0.50 55 0.62 103.45 55 <.001
Fatigued 0.501 50.08 49.92 1.66 55 0.10 88.54 55 0.00
Depressed 0.933 93.27 6.73 1.47 55 0.15 64.67 55 0.18
Lethargic 0.593 59.28 40.72 2.67 55 0.01 89.95 55 0.00
Bored 0.369 36.92 63.08 2.74 51 0.01 51.69 51 0.45
Distractible 0.244 24.39 75.61 -0.33 54 0.75 81.72 54 0.01
Negative/High Arousal
Worried 0.603 60.34 39.66 -0.86 55 0.40 108.69 55 <.001
Tense 0.534 53.42 46.58 0.97 55 0.34 97.40 55 <.001
Stressed 0.423 42.27 57.73 0.69 55 0.49 7.88 55 0.04
Upset 0.707 70.68 29.32 0.22 55 0.83 65.66 55 0.15
Nervous 0.648 64.85 35.15 -0.71 55 0.48 59.71 55 0.31
Angry 0.652 65.15 34.85 1.52 51 0.13 100.86 51 <.001
Positive/Low Arousal
Serene 0.404 40.39 59.61 2.70 55 0.01 101.37 55 <.001
Contented 0.257 25.66 74.34 1.94 55 0.06 89.75 55 0.00
Relaxed 0.254 25.44 74.56 -0.76 55 0.45 74.86 55 0.04
Calm 0.298 29.83 70.17 0.52 54 0.61 98.43 54 <.001
Happy 0.441 44.08 55.92 -0.39 55 0.70 78.52 55 0.02
Positive/High Arousal
Excited 0.381 38.13 61.87 -1.70 55 0.09 96.05 55 <.001
Elated 0.574 57.43 42.57 0.51 55 0.61 103.77 55 <.001
Awe 0.636 63.63 36.37 -0.60 52 0.55 55.84 52 0.33
Wonder 0.656 65.56 34.44 0.58 52 0.56 61.96 52 0.16






Linear and Nonlinear Analyses 
Simple regression was used to examine the relationship between the primary 
predictor (DM) and outcome variables.  Linear associations were expected, such that 
higher levels of DM should predict greater executive functioning, higher affective 
stability, lower presleep arousal, and higher waking sleep quality.  To further understand 
associations between variables and accommodate the possibility of nonparametric 
associations, nonlinear regression was also conducted.  All regression analyses used 
mean-centered DM as the predictor; linear regressions used the mean-centered DM 
variable as the predictor, quadratic regressions used the squared mean-centered DM 
variable as the predictor, and cubic regressions used the cubed mean-centered DM 
variable as the predictor.  Because no significant findings were observed for cubic or 




Objectively measured self-regulatory capacity (i.e., EF behavioral composite) was 
not significantly associated with DM or subjective measures of EF.  Examination of EF 
composite scores (i.e., executive and nonexecutive processes) and subtests revealed a 
uniform lack of association (ps > .05) with self-reported DM.  However, there was a 




awareness, but not mindful acceptance, were associated with fewer EF difficulties in the 
context of daily life across domains: set maintenance (e.g., difficulty concentrating, 
forgetfulness), regulating emotions (e.g., reacting emotionally, becoming easily upset), 
and regulating behaviors (e.g., doing things without thinking, failing to think things 
through before acting).  Of the self-reported EF subscales, emotion dysregulation was 
most strongly associated with indices of affective instability, including more extreme 
changes in negative/low arousal affect, higher levels of overall negative/high arousal 
affect, greater variability in negative/high arousal affect, and linear increases in 
negative/high arousal affect over the course of the day. 
 
Daytime Affective Stability 
The association between DM and daytime affective stability was assessed by 
examining stability in reported daytime affect ratings (Table 6).  There was no 
association between DM and average affect levels across the four valence/arousal affect 
groups, and global ratings of DM were not significantly associated with affective stability 
metrics for high arousal affect ratings.  However, DM was significantly associated with 
affective stability metrics for low arousal affect ratings.  Higher DM was associated with 
variability in negative/low arousal affect (e.g., sad, lethargic, bored, depressed, 
distractible, fatigued) around average levels of negative/low arousal affect (i.e., not 
correcting for temporal dependence).  When removing linear effects of time, the 
relationship between DM and variability in negative/low arousal affect was no longer 
significant.  Examination of affect-time slopes revealed that lower self-reported DM was 
associated with greater rates of change in negative/low arousal affect throughout the day 




slopes).  In other words, variability in negative/low arousal affect (i.e., raw IIV score) 
associated with lower DM appear to reflect sharper increases or decreases in negative/low 
arousal affect over the course of the day rather than greater variability around a 
temporally stable average.   
Conversely, higher DM was associated with less variability in positive/low 
arousal affect (i.e., relaxed, calm, serene, contented, happy) after controlling for temporal 
dependence.  These findings indicate that dispositionally high-mindful individuals show 
less extreme changes in low arousal negative affect and less variability in low arousal 
positive affect over the course of the day, suggesting that DM may temper low arousal 
mood states.  Examination of DM domains revealed that most associations with affective 
stability were driven by the mindful acceptance component; the one exception was the 
degree of change in negative/low arousal ratings over time, which was associated with 
mindful awareness and mindful acceptance.  In addition, mindful acceptance was 
associated with degree of change across negatively valenced mood states, regardless of 
arousal, indicating that higher levels of acceptance correspond to less severe increases or 
decreases in negative affect.  
 
Stress Recovery and Restoration 
The association between DM and stress recovery and restoration was assessed by 
examining measures of presleep arousal (i.e., measured the night of experience sampling) 
and sleep quality / disturbance (i.e., measured the following morning).  Higher reported 
DM was significantly associated with lower levels of subjective arousal prior to falling 
asleep, and higher levels of subjective sleep quality upon wakening.  Examination of 




and cognitive presleep arousal.  Although both mindful awareness and mindful 
acceptance were associated with somatic presleep arousal, only mindful awareness was 
associated with cognitive presleep arousal.  Further, waking sleep quality was 
significantly better for individuals reporting greater mindful awareness and lower 
cognitive presleep arousal; sleep quality was not significantly associated with mindful 
acceptance or somatic presleep arousal. 
 
Bootstrap Mediation 
Bootstrapping techniques were used to estimate the indirect effect of DM on 
restorative processes (i.e., PSA) through a single mediator (i.e., executive functioning and 
affective stability, examined separately).  Generally speaking, the bootstrapping 
procedure creates an empirical representation of the sampling distribution from which 
direct and indirect effects can be estimated.  Once completed, inferences about the size of 
the indirect effect (i.e., mediation) can be made by examining 95% confidence intervals 
(CI).  The null hypothesis of no indirect effect (i.e., no mediation) is rejected if zero does 
not lie within the CI.  Compared to the traditional “Baron and Kenny” (1986) approach, 
bootstrapping techniques have higher power and better Type I error control (MacKinnon, 
Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002) and have become the preferred approach to 
mediation analyses (Hayes, 2009).  The PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013) was 
used to test the simple mediation models.   
As previously reported (Table 5), higher DM significantly predicted lower 
presleep arousal (b = -.34, 95% CI [-.47, -.22], t = -5.37, p < .001), accounting for 37% of 
the variance in PSAS scores.  Results of linear regression revealed two possible 




arousal affect.  Mediation analyses were conducted with DM as the independent variable 
(X) and PSAS scores as the dependent variable (Y); cognitive and somatic PSA were 
examined separately in order to determine whether specific types of arousal were 
differentially influenced by executive functioning and affective stability. 
We began by examining the indirect effect of self-regulatory capacity, indexed by 
reported EF difficulties.  Higher self-reported DM was associated with fewer daytime EF 
difficulties (b = -.11, 95% CI [-.19, -.03], t = -2.7, p < .01); DM scores accounted for 13% 
of the variance in reported EF.  In turn, greater difficulties with daytime EF were 
associated with greater cognitive PSA (b = .25, 95% CI [.07, .43], t = 2.79, p < .01) and 
greater somatic PSA (b = .49, 95% CI [.12, .87], t = 2.65, p =.01).  The indirect effect of 
EF was significant for cognitive PSA (b = -.019, 95% BCa CI [-.054, -.00]), representing 
a relatively small effect size (K2 = .09, 95% CBa CI [.01, .24]).  However, there was no 
significant indirect effect of EF for somatic PSA (b = -.03, 95% BCa CI [-.09, .01]; K2 = 
.08, 95% CBa CI [.01, .22]). 
Next, we examined the indirect effect of affective stability, indexed by degree of 
change in negative/low arousal affect (i.e., absolute value of individually derived affect-
time slopes).  Higher self-reported DM was associated with less extreme changes in 
negative/low arousal affect (b = -.00, 95% CI [-.01, -.00], t = -2.49, p = .02), accounting 
for 10% of the variance in rates of change over time.  Changes in negative/low arousal 
affect were significantly associated with somatic PSA (b = .01, 95% CI [.00, .01], t = 
2.36, p = .02), but not cognitive PSA (b = .01, 95% CI [-.00, .02], t = 1.28, p = .21).  
Results of bootstrap mediation indicated that rate of change in negative/low arousal affect 




-.01, 95% CBa CI [-.02, .00]). 
To summarize, DM was significantly associated with reported self-regulatory 
capacity (i.e., EF), daytime stress regulation (i.e., variability in affect), and stress 
recovery (i.e., presleep arousal).  Results of bootstrap mediation indicated that global, 
self-reported difficulty in daytime EF significantly mediated the relationship between 
DM and cognitive PSA.  Further, although less extreme changes in negative/low arousal 
affect over the course of the day appear to be associated with both higher DM and lower 



















 The current study examined associations between dispositional mindfulness (DM) 
and markers of stress resilience in the context of everyday life.  To test whether DM is 
associated with self-regulatory capacity, daytime stress regulation, and stress recovery 
and restoration, this study incorporated objective measures of executive cognitive 
functioning with experience sampling reports of affect, daily life perceived executive 
difficulties, presleep arousal, and sleep quality.  DM was examined using a 
multidimensional self-report measure – the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire 
(FFMQ; Baer et al., 2006) – which allowed us to utilize facets most strongly associated 
with the overall mindfulness construct.  Consistent with the empirically supported 2-
factor model of mindfulness (i.e., Bishop et al., 2004), reliability analyses revealed three 
FFMQ facets representing both the focus and quality of present-moment attention (i.e., 
act with awareness, nonjudgment, nonreactivity).   
 
Self-Regulatory Capacity 
 Contrary to predictions, self-reported DM was not associated with a performance 
measure of executive functioning (EF).  This finding runs counter to the handful of 
studies reporting positive associations between DM and EF (i.e., controlled attention; 
Black, Semple, Pokhrel, & Grenard, 2011; Cheyne, Carriere, & Smilek, 2006; Oberle, 
Schonert-Reichl, Lawlor, & Thomson, 2011; Ostafin, Kassman, & Wessel, 2013).  




Neurocognitive tests used in previous studies rely heavily on lower order cognitive 
processes (i.e., processing speed, working memory), rather than higher order executive 
processes (i.e., cognitive flexibility, problem solving, response inhibition).  In addition, 
most studies used a unidimensional measure of DM that emphasizes mindful awareness, 
but not mindful acceptance.  Therefore, previous findings support the notion that certain 
aspects of mindfulness (i.e., awareness) are associated with specific cognitive abilities 
(i.e., attentional control), but fail to address the broader range of features represented by 
both the DM and EF constructs.  Consistent with previous findings, the current study – 
which included a multidimensional assessment of both DM and EF – found support for a 
link between self-reported EF and mindful awareness, but not mindful acceptance.  
Importantly, mindful awareness was associated with a broad range of daily life EF 
abilities, including cognitive, emotional, and behavioral self-regulation, suggesting that 
discrete features of mindfulness may support a broad range of regulatory functions. 
 There are several possible explanations for the lack of support for an association 
between DM and objective measures of EF.  One possibility is that DM is not associated 
with behavioral indices of self-regulation, but instead reflects subjectively experienced 
self-regulation.  Alternatively, it is possible that the measures used in this sample are 
either not sensitive enough to detect subtle differences in EF in relatively healthy young 
adults, or lack the ecological validity needed to capture functional differences in daily life 
self-regulation.  Researchers interested in addressing these questions are encouraged to 
exercise care when selecting measurement instruments. There is currently a lack of 
sensitive, ecologically valid, and standardized neuropsychological tests for measuring EF 




lack of normative data and heavy reliance on processing speed.  Consequently, when 
attempting to detect subtle differences in EF in healthy young adults – especially if there 
are reasons to differentiate between specific executive abilities (e.g., cognitive flexibility, 
inhibition, attentional control, etc.) – future research may benefit from using a 
multimethod approach that combines standardized neuropsychological measures, 
experimental cognitive tests, and self-report questionnaires.  
 
Daytime Stress Regulation 
 In this study, daytime stress regulation was indexed via affective stability.  Affect 
ratings representing the affective circumplex (i.e., positive/negative valence, low/high 
arousal; Russell, 1980) were obtained at random intervals via electronic diary during a 
single day.  Counter to previous research linking higher DM to greater tendencies toward 
positive affect (Branstrom, Duncan, & Moskowitz, 2011; Brown & Ryan, 2003; Jimenez 
et al., 2010) and lower tendencies toward negative affect (Barnhofer, Duggan, & Griffith, 
2011; Frewen, Evans, Maraj, Dozois, & Partridge, 2008; McKee, Zvolensky, Solomon, 
Bernstein, & Leen-Feldner, 2007; Coffey & Hartman, 2008), self-reported DM was not 
signficantly associated with average daytime affect ratings in any of the valence/arousal 
quadrants.  Interestingly, when variability in affect was taken into consideration, DM was 
primarily associated with variations in low arousal affect states.  Within the low arousal 
affect ratings, patterns of variability were dissociated on the basis of valence.  For 
dispositionally high-mindful individuals, ratings of negatively valenced low arousal affect 
(i.e., sad, lethargic, bored, depressed, distractible, fatigued) appeared to change less 
dramatically over the course of the day, whereas ratings of positively valenced low 




the day after removing the effect of time.   
 Examination of DM domains revealed that associations with low arousal affect 
ratings were primarily driven by mindful acceptance.  Consistent with theoretical models 
of mindfulness, individuals reporting higher DM were more consistently calm and 
relaxed over the course of the day.  Greater mindful acceptance was also associated with 
less dramatic change in all types of negative affect, including high arousal ratings (i.e., 
stressed, tense, angry, worried, upset, nervous).  Based on research linking stability in 
negative affect to overall emotional stability and risk for mood disorders (e.g., Bagge et 
al., 2004; Kuppens, Mechelen, Nezlek, Dossche, & Timmermans 2007; Russell, 
Moskowitz, Zuroff, Sookman, & Paris, 2007), higher levels of mindful acceptance may 
promote emotional stability by protecting against dramatic shifts in negative affect over 
the course of the day.  This also suggests, however, that initial levels of negative affect 
are less likely to change over the course of the day. While this may be protective for 
individuals with lower starting levels of negative affect, maintenance of higher starting 
levels of negative affect throughout the day could be disadvantageous.  Future research 
may benefit from examining the association between initial affect levels, rates of affect 
change throughout the day, and end of day outcomes (i.e., presleep arousal, sleep 
quality). 
 
Nighttime Stress Recovery and Restoration 
 Consistent with predictions, higher self-reported DM was associated with lower 
reported presleep arousal and higher reported waking sleep quality.  Although global 
levels of presleep arousal were associated with both mindful awareness and mindful 




Importantly, mindful awareness refers to the ability to maintain present-moment 
attention, whereas cognitive presleep arousal is associated with tendencies to focus 
negative and unproductive attention on events from the past (i.e., rumination) and the 
future (i.e., worry) (Harvey, 2000, 2002).  Thus, the general ability to focus attention on 
the present moment could protect against nighttime perseverative cognitions (see, e.g., 
Brosschot, Gerin, & Thayer, 2006; Brosschot, Pieper, & Thayer, 2005) that may lead to 
diminished sleep quality.  Interestingly, both mindful awareness and cognitive presleep 
arousal predicted waking sleep quality, suggesting that the ability to stay in the present 
moment may promote stress restoration by facilitating stress recovery.   
 
Models of Stress Resilience in Daily Life 
 A unified model of dispositional mindfulness (DM) and stress regulation can be 
directly informed by existing theory, including the Mindful Coping Model (MCM; 
Garland, Gaylord, & Park, 2009; Garland et al., 2011).  Grounded in stress appraisal 
theory (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), the MCM acknowledges that stressful events and 
negative stress appraisals are ubiquitous and unavoidable in daily life.  The MCM further 
asserts that the stress response, once elicited, can be de-escalated and redirected via 
reappraisal processes, which involve reinterpreting contextual cues and meaning in a 
way that changes the trajectory of the initial response.  Numerous studies have 
demonstrated beneficial effects of cognitive reappraisal, including reduced psychological 
and physiological responses to stress (e.g., Bower et al., 2008; Helgeson et al., 2006; 
Mauss, Cook, Cheng, & Gross, 2007).  Importantly, rather than attempting to control or 
alter an emotional response, which can prolong or exacerbate psychological and 




Levenson, 1997; Tull & Gratz, 2008), reappraisal involves re-examining one’s 
relationship to events, beliefs, and emotions. 
 According to the MCM, the primary mechanism underlying positive reappraisal 
processes is mindful decentering.  Described as a “transitory metacognitive state” 
characterized by broadened awareness and cognitive flexibility (Garland et al., 2011, p. 
60), mindful decentering allows the individual to disengage from initial stress appraisals, 
consider a broader range of interpretations, reappraise stressors (i.e., benign, valuable, 
beneficial), and experience reduced stress and positive affect.  Over time, the ‘active 
ingredients’ of the MCM – mindful decentering and positive reappraisal – are believed to 
promote an upward positive spiral that is reciprocal, self-perpetuating, and protective 
(Garland, Gaylord, Boettiger, & Howard, 2010; Garland et al., 2011).   
 Consistent with MCM theory, DM is associated with self-reported positive 
reappraisal tendencies across multiple samples (i.e., healthy adults, contemplative 
practitioners, college students, chronic pain outpatients, alcohol-dependent inpatients), 
even when controlling for related factors such as psychological well-being, positive 
affect, and positive refocusing (Hanley & Garland, 2014).  Furthermore, DM is 
associated with cognitive abilities believed to be necessary precursors to reappraisal, 
including decentering (Coffey & Hartman, 2008; Hayes-Skelton & Graham, 2012; 
Pearson, Brown, Bravo, & Mitkiewitz, 2014) and cognitive flexibility (Anicha et al., 
2012).  In other words, broadened awareness afforded by mindful decentering may allow 
for less reactive and more flexible processing of information and facilitation of (low 
arousal) positive affective states. 




regulation is found in neuroimaging studies.  Cognitive reappraisal is associated with 
increased activation in brain regions associated with reasoning and problem solving (i.e., 
dorsolateral PFC) and self-monitoring (i.e., mPFC, anterior cingulate cortex) (Levesque 
et al., 2003; Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002; Ochsner, Ray et al., 2004) and 
decreased activation of the amygdala (Ochsner et al., 2002; Ochsner, Ray eta l. 2004; 
Schaefer et al., 2002).  Similar patterns of activation have been found with individuals 
reporting high DM (Modinos et al., 2010).  These findings are consistent with a larger 
corpus of research linking PFC-amygdala circuitry to stress regulation (Davidson, 
Putnam, & Larson, 2000; Oschsner & Gross, 2005), suggesting that mindfulness and 
reappraisal processes work concomitantly to down-regulate the stress response.   
 Over time, frequent engagement of mindful decentering and reappraisal processes 
may alter the trajectory of the stress response altogether.  Just as negative emotional 
states promote maladaptive stress appraisals via reduced tonic inhibition of the PFC-
amygdala circuitry (McEwen, 2003b), positive emotional states can produce lasting 
neurobiological changes that perpetuate more adaptive stress appraisals (see E. L. 
Garland & Howard, 2009 for a review), perhaps by directly enhancing thought-action 
repertoires (i.e., broaden-and-build theory: Fredrickson, 2001).  In other words, a 
predisposition toward low arousal positive affect, thought to characterize high-DM 
individuals (e.g., Branstrom et al., 2011; Brown & Ryan, 2003; Jimenez et al., 2010), 
may result from a combination of controlled and flexible processes that simultaneously 
serve as a buffer against negative stress appraisals (Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004; Tugade, 







 Additional research is needed to replicate current findings and support existing 
theoretical models of mindfulness.  To that end, several strengths and limitations of the 
present study can be used to inform directions for future research.  The main strengths of 
the current study lie in the methodological approach to examining DM and daily life 
variability in affect.  Consistent with mindfulness theory (Bishop et al., 2004) and related 
empirical findings (e.g., Brown & Ryan, 2003; Cardaciotto et al., 2008; Evans & 
Segerstrom, 2011; Kohls et al., 2009; Lau et al., 2006), this study examined a 2-factor 
model of dispositional mindfulness by identifying subscales from the FFMQ that yielded 
the highest statistical reliability and theoretical congruence with the mindfulness 
construct.  The current study also employed experience sampling methodology to 
measure affect at multiple times throughout the day, presleep arousal prior to falling 
asleep, and subjective sleep quality upon waking.  The increased reliability and validity 
of experience sampling methods compared to retrospective reports (i.e., Csikszentmihalyi 
& Larson, 1987; Reis & Gable, 2000; Scollon, Prieto, & Diener, 2009) lends additional 
weight to the current findings.  Further, since we were particularly interested in affective 
stability, a strength of the present study was the use of affect ratings that 
comprehensively represented the affective circumplex.  By parsing affect by valence and 
arousal, we were able to more closely understand nuanced relationships linking 
mindfulness to emotion regulation patterns in daily life.  This approach also yielded 
important insights about the nature of affect in dispositionally high-mindful individuals, 
and future research should consider using similarly fine-grained approaches to understand 




Despite the numerous methodological strengths of the current study, several 
weaknesses will need to be addressed in future research.  First, although our approach to 
operationalizing DM was theoretically and empirically informed, additional research is 
needed to examine the validity and reliability of this relatively novel approach.  Second, 
this study relied on a modestly sized, homogenous sample.  Additional research is needed 
to determine whether the current findings can be generalized to more diverse groups on 
the basis of age, race, ethnicity, education, and culture.  Further, given the established 
relationship between intelligence and executive functioning, future research should 
measure and control for general intelligence before interpreting findings.  Additional 
related constructs should also be considered.  For example, participants high or low in 
emotional intelligence may have very different profiles of affect ratings independent of 
self-reported levels of dispositional mindfulness.  Alternatively, participants familiar with 
mindfulness – either through popular culture exposure or mindful behaviors, such as 
meditation or yoga – may have different response patterns.  In addition to controlling for 
possible confounds, future research should obtain daily assessments for longer periods of 
time, consider dynamic associations between waking affect and affective trajectories, and 
examine lagged effects over time. 
 
Conclusions 
Results from the current study provide support for a 2-factor model of 
dispositional mindfulness consisting of both mindful awareness and mindful acceptance.  
Mindful awareness was associated with measures of self-regulation (i.e., reported 
cognitive, emotional, and behavioral regulation in daily life), stress recovery (i.e., 




mindful acceptance was associated with markers of affective stability, with greater 
acceptance predicting less extreme changes in negatively valenced affect, greater stability 
across low arousal affect, and less variability in positively valenced/low arousal affect.  
These results suggest that DM may protect against stress and promote healthy, adaptive 
functioning via distinct yet complementary processes.  In addition, these results support 
current models of mindfulness (e.g., Mindful Coping Model; Garland et al., 2011) 
emphasizing both the focus of attention (i.e., present-moment, broadband) and the quality 
of attention (i.e., acceptance, positive appraisal).  Future research is needed to better 
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